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Abstract 
This paper asks whether educational mismatches can account for the positive 
association between education and wage inequality found in the data. We use two 
different data sources, the European Community Household Panel and the Portuguese 
Labour Force Survey, and consider several types of mismatch, including 
overqualification, underqualification and skills mismatch. We test our hypothesis using 
two different measurement methods, the ‘statistical’ and the ‘subjective’ approach. The 
results are robust to the different choices and unambiguously show that the positive 
effect of education on wage inequality is not due to the prevalence of educational 
mismatches in the labour market.  
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“What matters, then, isn't what you do or where you live, but what you know. 
When two-thirds of all new jobs require a higher education or advanced training, 
knowledge is the most valuable skill you can sell. It's not only a pathway to 
opportunity, but it's a prerequisite for opportunity” 
 
Extract from President Obama’s education speech in Ohio, September 9, 2008 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Education plays a fundamental role in providing the basis for economic growth, social cohesion 
and personal development in modern societies. Better educated people tend to enjoy better 
health, exhibit pro-social behaviour, engage more in political and civic participation, raise more 
educated children, and are less likely to participate (actively or passively) in crimes. From an 
economic standpoint, it is widely recognized that knowledge and human capital play an 
increasingly central role in the economic success of nations and individuals. Better educated 
people are more productive and innovative, more likely to be economically active, earn higher 
wages and experience higher wage growth over their working lives1. Consequently, the design 
of effective and efficient educational systems is currently a major policy issue in wealthy and 
poor societies around the globe.  
 
There is, however, one aspect of education that rings some alarm bells among social scientists 
in general and economists in particular. Conventional wisdom asserts that policies aimed to 
increase average schooling levels are expected to reduce earnings inequality by increasing the 
proportion of high-wage workers. A more balanced distribution of education, it is argued, will 
result in a more balanced distribution of earnings. Still, recent international research has shown 
by means of quantile regression analysis that wage inequality is higher among more educated 
individuals (Buchinsky, 1994, Pereira and Martins, 2002, Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer, 2003, 
Martins and Pereira, 2004, Machado and Mata, 2005). To use an economist’s term, this 
observation is other things equal (i.e., conditional on controlling for a wide range of labour 
market characteristics that may also affect the earnings distribution of the different education 
groups, such as professional experience, occupation, sector and gender) and, consequently, has 
                                                          
1
 For evidence on the social and economic benefits of education see, for example, Ashenfelter and Rouse (2000), 
Wolfe and Haveman (2001) and Dolton et al. (2009). 
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been termed the ‘inequality increasing effect’ of education: if (conditional) wage dispersion is 
higher for more educated individuals, then an educational expansion may add to overall wage 
inequality. 
 
This finding raises important policy implications. First, it suggests that the inequality-reducing 
scope typically attributed to education is thornier than previously thought. Second, individuals 
consciously invest in themselves to improve their own, personal economic returns. A person 
may study architecture because she likes designing, but also because architects earn more than 
regular people. However, the higher inequality found among the educated warns that, in doing 
so, she exposes herself to greater wage uncertainty. Previous studies have shown that this 
uncertainty can be substantial (Cunha et al., 2005, Cunha and Heckman, 2007) and that it may 
exert a large influence on the decision on extended schooling (Carneiro et al., 2003, Hartog and 
Serrano, 2007, Hogan and Walker, 2007) and on the wage distribution in the society (Hartog et 
al., 2003, Bonin et al., 2007, Hartog and Vijverberg, 2007).  
 
Despite these policy concerns, up to date the causes of the positive association between 
education and conditional wage dispersion remain mostly unknown. Among the plausible 
explanations, overeducation is the one that has been suggested more frequently. Machin (1996), 
Green et al. (1999), Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer (2003) and Martins and Pereira (2004), among 
others, put forward the notion that overeducation may be responsible for the higher wage 
dispersion among the educated or, alternatively, for the widening wage dispersion experienced 
by this group over the last years. As Martins and Pereira (2004, p. 365) put it, ‘situations where 
highly-schooled workers take jobs with a low skill requirement and consequent low pay would 
be consistent with these results’. The empirical evidence supports this intuition. First, it is well 
documented that a significant proportion of the labour force works in jobs that are not 
commensurate with their qualifications (Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000). Second, the 
survey of empirical studies shows that overeducated workers earn less than workers who have 
the same education but hold jobs for which they are adequately educated. The estimated wage 
gap can be as large as 8% in Kiker et al. (1997) for Portugal, 13% in Verdugo and Verdugo 
(1989) and 11% in Cohn and Kahn (1995) for the US, 26% in Groot (1996) for Holland and 
35% in Dolton and Silles (2008) for the UK. When differentiating between the years required to 
match the educational requirement of the job and the years that exceed the educational level 
needed at the job, researchers usually find that excess education gives a 50% lower return than 
the return to required education (Hartog, 2000, McGuinness, 2006). Therefore, we expect that, 
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relative to the adequately educated, overeducated workers are located at lower deciles of the 
earnings distribution and earn a lower return from their educational investment. The incidence 
of overeducation would then act as a mechanism enhancing wage dispersion within similarly 
educated individuals.    
 
Although frequently suggested, this hypothesis has not been tested to date. In this paper we take 
a step towards filling this gap by asking: can overeducation account for the ‘inequality 
increasing effect’ of education? Answering this question is compelling, as educational 
mismatches are receiving a lot of attention as a potential source of the recent increase in total 
within-groups-inequality observed in developed countries. We take Portugal as case study, for 
in this country the inequality increasing effect of education has been found to be particularly 
acute (Martins and Pereira, 2004).  
 
Overeducation describes the extent to which an individual possesses a level of education in 
excess of that which is required for his job. A first methodological point concerns the 
measurement of this excess education. Two approaches can be distinguished in the literature. 
The ‘subjective’ approach is based on the worker’s self-assessment regarding the quality of the 
match between his education and the educational requirements of the job (e.g., Halaby, 1994). A 
variation of this method asks workers what the minimum educational requirements are for the 
job, and then compares this report with the actual education level of the worker (e.g., Duncan 
and Hoffman, 1981, Cohn and Khan, 1995, Daly et al., 2000, Dolton and Vignoles, 2000). The 
second approach consists on finding out the educational requirements externally. A worker is 
regarded to be overeducated (undereducated) if he has more (less) education than is required for 
the job. A number of studies establish the job level requirements by calculating the mean/mode 
value within occupations (e.g., Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989, Kiker et al., 1997, Bauer, 2002). 
This method is frequently termed the ‘statistical’ approach. Some other authors prefer to rest 
upon the formal evaluation of independent job analysts to determine the correct level of 
education required for each job title (e.g., Decker et al., 2002). All these methods present their 
advantages and limitations. For the purpose of the present paper, it suffices to recall that none of 
the above methods outperforms the others, and that the extent and effects of overeducation may 
differ across measures (Battu et al., 2000, Rubb, 2004, Verhaest and Omey, 2006, 2009). 
Similarly, certain personal characteristics appear to be more or less statistically related to 
overeducation depending on the measurement method.  
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On the basis of this ground, we test our central hypothesis using the two alternative 
measurement methods that have gained currency in the overeducation literature, the ‘subjective’ 
and the ‘statistical’ approach. This refinement is based on the utilization of two different 
datasets, the Portuguese Labour Force Survey and the European Community Household Panel, 
and allows us to better assess the robustness of our findings. A second methodological feature is 
that we consider different definitions of mismatch, not just overqualification. Specifically, we 
differentiate between ‘overqualification’, ‘underqualification’ and ‘skills mismatch’, and define 
yet another category, ‘strong mismatch’, to refer to those workers who are overqualified and, at 
the same time, lack necessary skills. Although most studies primarily focus on 
overqualification, there is no presumption that the effects of other forms of mismatch are less 
relevant. Moreover, a review of the existing literature suggests that differences in the amount, 
not just the incidence, of mismatch should be taken into consideration (Hartog, 2000). To that 
purpose, we use a statistical approach that explicitly differentiates between levels of over- and 
under-qualification.  
 
Finally, most of the debate in the policy arena has gravitated around the question of to what 
extent the incidence of educational mismatches entail a productivity loss. On the one hand, 
mismatched workers may be in some way less able and lack some of the abilities and skills 
required to do a job commensurate with their education. In this case, the mismatch pay penalty 
would be a spurious statistical finding reflecting an omitted variables problem rather than a real 
economic problem. On the other hand, the mismatch phenomenon may reflect a real 
missadjustment between the worker’s potential and the job’s productivity ceiling. The available 
evidence is rather mixed (Green et al., 1999, Bauer, 2002, McGuinness, 2003). The results in this 
paper are based on quantile regression and provide valuable insights on this debate. Specifically, 
we investigate whether the wage effects of mismatch are homogeneous across segments 
(quantiles) of the earnings distribution. Assuming that earnings capacity is given by the 
individuals’ unobserved ability, the estimates at different quantiles provide snap-shots of how 
mismatched individuals within different ability groups are impacted relative to their well-
matched counterparts. The major advantage of this approach is that it prevents us from 
comparing higher ability matched individuals with lower ability mismatched individuals, thus 
eliminating the potential bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity. We use the results to 
investigate whether educational mismatches entail a real productivity loss or, on the contrary, are 
the result of the low ability levels possessed by certain individuals.  
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The next section establishes the paper’s research hypotheses. Section 3 presents the datasets and 
the definitions of mismatch used in the analysis. Section 4 outlines the quantile regression 
framework and introduces the Subjective and the Statistical model. Section 5 calculates quantile 
returns to education and inspects whether educational mismatches can account for the dispersion 
in the returns across quantiles. Besides, the wage effects of overqualification, 
underqualification, skills mismatch and strong mismatch at different points of the conditional 
wage distribution are documented. Section 6 discusses the results and presents concluding 
remarks. Appendix A contains the description of the variables used in the regressions. For a 
sensitivity analysis, Appendix B contains the estimates when a restricted rather than a full set of 
controls is used in the earnings equations. 
 
2. Research hypotheses  
 
We inherit the tradition of labour economists of estimating a set of wage equations in which 
individual earnings are explained in terms of a wide range of individual demographic and labour 
market characteristics. Among these characteristics, we include the crux of our analysis: 
education and mismatch status. The equations are used to calculate returns to schooling at 
different segments of the earnings distribution. Differences in these returns represent residual 
inequalities of pay that can be attributed to education (Buchinsky, 1994). Our first research 
question is whether the resulting inequalities are increasing as we move towards more educated 
groups. More specifically, 
 
• Question 1: Is there an inequality increasing effect of education? 
This hypothesis is the least original, and has been already covered in existing work. The 
following question is more innovative. Specifically, we hypothesize that discriminating between 
matched and mismatched workers should remove part of the observed dispersion within 
education levels. Specifically, our second research question is: 
 
• Question 2: Is the inequality increasing effect of education due to the prevalence of 
educational mismatches in the labour market? 
 
This question, which is central in the paper, can be potentially broken up into two separate 
questions if we consider the various definitions and measurements of mismatch outlined above. 
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Specifically,  
 
• Question 2a: Is the inequality increasing effect of education due to the prevalence of various 
types of educational mismatches in the labour market? 
 
• Question 2b: Is the inequality increasing effect of education due to individual differences in 
the degree of educational mismatch? 
 
Finally, our third research question is: 
 
• Question 3: Is the pay penalty of educational mismatch homogenous across individuals in 
different segments of the earnings distribution? 
 
3. Data and measurement of mismatch 
 
We use information from two sources: the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and 
the Portuguese Labour Force Survey (PLFS). The ECHP is a representative survey that covers 
15 European countries. It contains personal and labour market characteristics, including wage, 
education, hours worked, tenure, experience, sector, firm size, marital status and immigrant 
condition, among other variables. For the present study, we use pooled data from 1994-2001 
and the Portuguese subsample of the dataset. The PLFS is a quarterly survey of a representative 
sample of households in Portugal. Its sample size is about 45,000 individuals, and it has a 
rotating structure in which 1/6 of the sample is dropped randomly in each quarter. We use 
pooled data from 2000 to 2002. The variables included in the PLFS are very similar to those 
included in the ECHP. An advantage of the PLFS over the ECHP is that it describes more 
accurately the educational attainment of respondents. Specifically, the PLFS includes ten 
categories that range from ‘No studies’ to ‘Doctoral degree’, each of them associated with a 
certain number of (minimum) years of schooling. In the ECHP, in turn, the educational variable 
is coded in three broad categories (less than upper secondary, upper secondary and tertiary 
education) based on the ISCED-97 classification (OECD, 2003). An advantage of the ECHP 
over the PLFS is that it includes two self-assessed measures of the quality of the match between 
the worker’s education and the requirements of the job.  
 
In the two datasets, we restrict the sample to full-time, private sector, male wage earners aged 
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between 21 and 55, who work normally between 15 and 70 hours a week, and are not employed 
in the agricultural sector. The case of women is disregarded on account of the extra 
complication of potential selectivity bias. Workers with a monthly wage rate that is less than 
10% or over 10 times the average wage have been also excluded. These restrictions leave us 
with a final sample of 8,319 individuals in the ECHP and 11,947 in the PLFS.  
 
3.1 The subjective approach (ECHP) 
 
The ECHP includes two questions with the worker’s self-assessment regarding the quality of the 
match between acquired education and the requirements of the job. These questions have 
already been used by Alba-Ramírez and Blázquez (2002), Wasmer et al. (2007) and Budría and 
Moro-Egido (2008). The first self-evaluation question is 
 
• (S1) Do you feel that you have skills or qualifications to do a more demanding job than 
the one you have now? 
 
This information is used to identify those workers with excess education (S1: ‘yes’). The second 
question is  
 
• (S2) Have you had formal training or education that has given you skills needed for 
your present type of work? 
 
This information allows us to identify those workers who did not acquire necessary skills 
through training and education (S2: ’no’)2. Using S1 and S2 we can construct the following 
categories 
1) Workers with excess education but with appropriate skills (S1: ‘yes’, S2: ‘yes’). We 
will term them as, simply, the ‘overqualified’. 
                                                          
2Through the paper we abuse language somewhat and will refer to these workers as workers who ‘lack necessary 
skills’. We are aware, however, that there might be individuals who have not had formal education and training for 
unskilled jobs but who have acquired the necessary background through other sources, including peer observation, 
learning by doing and general work experience. Although these channels are typically less relevant, they might be 
important for a small fraction of uneducated individuals working in low level jobs. As most other measures of 
mismatch, a limitation of our definition is that it focuses on formal education and training and disregards other 
sources of skills acquisition. 
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2) Non-overqualified workers who did not acquire necessary skills (S1: ‘no’, S2: ‘no’). 
We will refer to them as the ‘skills mismatched’. 
3) Workers who, despite having excess education, lack necessary skills (S1: ‘yes’, S2: 
‘no’). We will term these workers as the ‘strongly mismatched’. 
4) Workers with appropriate education and skills (S1: ‘no’, S2: ‘yes’). This is our 
reference group, composed by ‘matched workers’.  
 
As an illustration of the different types of mismatch, consider an individual with a bachelor 
degree in marketing employed as 
 
i) a salesman. In this situation, he may feel that his university degree allows him to do 
a more demanding job, even though it helps him to perform his current job. Thus, 
he would be considered an ‘overqualified’ worker. 
ii) a computer engineer. In this case, he may feel that his formal education does not 
allow him to perform a more demanding job nor has provided him with the skills 
needed to perform the job. Thus, he would be labelled as ‘skills mismatched’. 
iii) a gardener. In this case, the individual presumably will report that his university 
degree allows him to do a more demanding job, yet it has not provided him with the 
skills needed to be a gardener. Thus, he will be considered as a ‘strongly 
mismatched’ worker. 
 
Before advancing, two remarks are in order. First, most measures of mismatch used in the 
literature are exclusively based on the level of education attained by the individual. However, 
workers who declare not to be overqualified may have an inappropriate job match when the 
content, not the level, of their education is evaluated. As Sloane (2002, p.7) puts it ‘in some 
measures of overeducation reference is made to the level of education rather than the type of 
education. Thus a worker may still be mismatched if the level of education is appropriate, but its 
type inappropriate, such as an English graduate being hired as a statistician’. Exploring the 
effects of having inappropriate qualifications seems compelling, as there is no presumption that 
these are less important than the effects of having excess qualifications. This is why we 
complement the information reported in S1 with that reported in S2. Second, workers with 
excess education are typically regarded as ‘overeducated’ in the literature. However, as is clear 
from the previous examples, the term ‘overeducation’ may be seriously misleading. Workers 
who have excess education and, additionally, are mismatched in terms of skills can be hardly 
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labelled as ‘overeducated’, as their formal education did not provide them with the necessary 
background. This is why we split the group of workers with excess education (S1: ‘yes’) into 
those who are simply ‘overqualified’ (S2: ‘yes’) and those who are ‘strongly mismatched’ (S2: 
‘no’).  
 
In Table 1 we report the incidence of the different types of mismatch together with summary 
statistics for each group. The variables listed in the table are described in Appendix A. The 
proportion of overqualified, skills mismatched and strongly mismatched workers is, 
respectively, 12.6%, 44.6% and 32.4%. These figures indicate that most workers (77.0%) lack 
some skills that are required in their jobs. It is worth mentioning that approximately seven out of 
ten of the workers with excess qualifications (S1: ‘yes’) are strongly mismatched (S2: ‘no’).  
 
The large proportion of mismatched workers in our data should not come as a surprise, as 
subjective measures of mismatch tend to render large estimates. Indeed, our figures can be 
directly compared to those reported in Wasmer et al. (2007), who use the same dataset and 
taxonomy of mismatch to provide a European perspective on the topic. They report that in 
Europe as a whole, the incidence of overqualification, skills mismatch and strong mismatch is 
33.0%, 24.7% and 21.1%, respectively. In Portugal, therefore, the extent of mere 
overqualification is low and the extent of skills mismatch is high by European standards. This 
outcome is consistent with the low educational attainment and training participation of the 
Portuguese labour force3.  
 
Some interesting differences across groups emerge in Table 1. The overqualified earn the 
highest wages (1.25), are more likely to have tertiary education (22%), employer-financed 
training (32%), less experience (12.2 years), work in the services sector (58%), in larger firms 
(28% work in a firm with 100 workers or more), and are less likely to report bad health (1%). 
As opposite, workers who are skills mismatched or strongly mismatched earn lower wages (0.89 
and 0.91, respectively), are less likely to have university education (1%), training (3% and 5%, 
respectively), work in larger firms (less than 15% work in a firm with 100 workers or more), 
and are more likely to report bad health (6% and 3%). The overqualified tend to work in white-
collar occupations (‘Professionals’ and ‘Technicians and associate professionals’), while the 
                                                          
3
 In Portugal, only 27.6% of the adult population (25-64 years old) has completed upper secondary education, while 
in Europe as a whole (EU-25) this proportion rises to 69.7%. Similarly, training participation in Portugal is 3.8%, 
against 10.1% in EU-25 (Eurostat, 2007). 
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skills and the strongly mismatched are more likely to be blue-collar workers (‘Craft and related 
trades workers’, ‘Plant and machine operators and assemblers’ and ‘Elementary occupations’). 
Finally, differences across groups in terms of tenure, unemployment experience and marital 
status are relatively small. 
 
In Table 2 we examine more closely the connection between mismatch status and education 
level. One might expect that the high educated are more likely to be overqualified and less 
likely to lack necessary skills, and this is what is observed. The proportion of overqualified 
workers is increasing in the education level, from 6.9% in the group with less than upper 
secondary education to 58.5% in the group with a tertiary education. As opposite, the incidence 
of skills mismatch is higher among the less educated, ranging from 2.8% in the tertiary-level 
group up to 51.1% in the less educated group. Finally, the proportion of matched workers is 
increasing in education, ranging from 8.1% (less than upper secondary) to 32.2% (tertiary). In 
other words, the self-reported variables seem to be behaving reasonably. 
 
3.2 The statistical approach (PLFS) 
 
Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) defined required schooling as a one standard-deviation range 
around the mean level of schooling within an occupation. Workers are considered to be 
adequately educated, overqualified or underqualified depending on whether their actual 
education falls within, above or below this range, respectively. For the present study, however, 
we use the modal value rather than the mean value. As Kiker et al. (1997) point out, this choice 
reduces the sensitivity to outliers and changes in workplace organization4.  
 
With this method, actual years of schooling of individual i working in occupation j, )( aijS , can be 
decomposed into required years of schooling in occupation j, )( rjS , years of overschooling, )( oijS , 
and years of underschooling ( uijS ), where rjS  is the modal value within the occupation and 
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4
 Using the mean rather than the modal value produced only small changes in the estimates. The results are available 
upon request. 
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Two data features are desirable when implementing the statistical approach. First, the 
educational attainment of individuals should be sufficiently detailed. Otherwise, the modal level 
of education within an occupation may result into a broad education category that pools together 
workers whose education level is not comparable. Second, the occupation variable should be 
sufficiently disaggregated. Otherwise, we may be pooling together jobs with very different 
educational requirements. The PLFS exhibits these two ingredients. The educational 
classification is coded in ten categories that result into nine different levels of years schooling, 
and occupations are disaggregated on a 2-digit level based on the National Classification of 
Occupations (CNP). For each occupation, we compute the modal value of years of schooling 
and then calculate the corresponding years of over-, under- and required schooling for each 
individual within the occupation. Occupations with less than 10 observations were excluded 
from the analysis5.  
 
A concern with our data is that as education levels are very low in Portugal, the modal level of 
education might be similarly low in almost all occupations. If this is the case, our measure of 
required education could be criticized for not being subtle enough to capture the expected 
variations across occupations. To allay this concern, in Figure 1 we report the frequency, as 
measured by the number of occupations, of each modal level of schooling. As expected, the 
modal value is low in most occupations, with 4 years of schooling being the most frequent 
outcome (12). Still, we detect some variation in required schooling across occupations. 
Specifically, almost 42% of the occupations (11 out of 26) are associated with 9 or more years 
of schooling, and in five occupations the modal value of schooling amounts to 16 years. Such 
dispersion seems substantial, as the sample mean of actual years of schooling is as low as 6.22 
in the data. 
 
In Table 3 we report the summary statistics. With the statistical method the proportion of 
overqualified and underqualified workers is 36.8% and 18.7%, respectively. Overqualified 
workers have on average 7.70 years of schooling, 3.35 of which are in excess to those required 
in the job. Underqualified workers, in turn, are less educated than average (4.98 years) and have 
4.35 years of schooling less than what is required in their occupations. All groups work a 
similar number of hours, but the overqualified earn 11% less than the underqualified (1.01 
against 1.12). The overqualified have less experience than average (14.7 against 24.3 years), 
less tenure (50% are below five years), tend to be single (43%) and are likely to be ‘Skilled 
                                                          
5
 This exclusion restriction affected 3 occupations and 0.1% of the workers in the initial sample.  
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workers, craftsmen and similar’ (48%). The underqualified in turn, are more concentrated in the 
‘Middle management and technicians’ and ‘Administrative and related workers’ occupations 
(20% and 32%, respectively).  
 
3.3 Are the subjective and statistical indicators comparable?  
 
Comparisons between methods must be undertaken very carefully, insofar as in most cases they 
measure different things. Thus, for example, 36.8% of the workers in the PLFS sample have 
excess education, while in the ECHP only 12.6% is regarded as being ‘overqualified’. The 
difference is potentially intriguing. It may also be intriguing the fact that the ‘overqualified’ in 
the ECHP earn higher wages than their well-marched counterparts (1.25 versus 1.19), while the 
opposite occurs in the PLFS (1.01 versus 1.06). However, it should not be so if we recall that 
the group of ‘overqualified’ individuals in the ECHP was restricted to include only those who 
have the necessary skills for their jobs. Individuals with excess education but with insufficient 
skills are the ‘strongly mismatched’, who represent 32.5% of the total population and earn very 
low wages (0.91). Aggregating, we find that in the ECHP the total fraction of workers with 
excess education amounts to 45.0% and earns an average wage of 1.00. These figures come 
closer to the corresponding estimates in the PLFS (36.8% and 1.01, respectively).  
 
Similarly, 44.6% of the ECHP sample individuals report that they do not have excess 
qualifications and that they lack necessary skills. Presumably, an important fraction of these 
workers has less education than required. However, the incidence of underqualification is as low 
as 18.7% in the PLFS. Again, the difference is less intriguing if we consider that the ECHP 
‘skills mismatch’ group may include two types of workers. On the one hand, the underqualified, 
i.e., those who did not acquired necessary skills because they did not acquire a sufficiently high 
level of education. On the other hand, those with ‘wrong’ qualifications, i.e., those who 
completed a high level of education but work in jobs that are not related to the content of their 
education. Therefore, the ECHP measure provides a more global indicator of the different skills 
shortages that take place in the labour market.  
 
4. Estimating models 
The quantile regression model can be written as  
 )1  ( with                         βX  )X| w(lnQuant                   eβX wln θii iθ  θiθii =+=
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where Xi is the vector of exogenous variables and βθ is the vector of parameters. Quantθ(ln wi| Xi) 
denotes the θth conditional quantile of ln w given X. The θth regression quantile, 0<θ <1, is 
defined as a solution to the problem 
 
 
 
which, after defining the check function ρθ (z)=θz if z≥ 0 or ρθ (z)=(θ –1)z if z < 0, can be written 
as  
 
 
This problem is solved using linear programming methods, while standard errors for the vector of 
coefficients are obtained using bootstrap techniques (Buchinsky, 1998).  
 
4.1 The Subjective model  
 
We use the following earnings equation for the ECHP data, 
 
        (4)i θ θ i θ i θ i θiln w α δ X β E γ M e                                           = + + + +  
 
where ln wi is the logarithm of the net hourly wage, Xi is a vector of controls, Ei includes two 
education dummies, one for upper secondary education and one for tertiary education, and Mi 
includes three dummy variables controlling for, respectively, overqualification, skills mismatch 
and strong mismatch. This specification is similar to that used in Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), 
who were the first to use a categorical variable to measure the effects of overeducation on wages. 
Later on, this equation was adopted by Dolton and Vignoles (2000) and Bauer (2002), among 
others. 
 
4.2 The Statistical model 
 
For the PLFS, we use the following earnings equation 
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where 
uθβ is the return to a year of schooling below the schooling requirement, rθβ is the return 
to years of required education, and 
oθβ is the return to an additional year of schooling beyond 
those required. This specification, termed the ORU model in the literature, was first introduced 
by Duncan and Hoffman (1981) and since then has inspired many other studies (e.g., Cohn and 
Kahn, 1995, Kiker et al., 1997). In words of Hartog (2000, p. 144), ‘the ORU earnings function 
has proven itself as an extension of the canonical Mincerian earnings function, by passing 
statistical testing in several countries for several datasets and several years’. An advantage of 
the statistical model over the subjective is that it controls for the amount, not just for the 
incidence, of mismatch.  
 
5. Results 
 
In this section we calculate returns to education and examine how their dispersion across 
quantiles changes when explicit controls for mismatch are included in the earnings equation. In 
a second stage, we document how the effect of mismatch on wages differs across segments of 
the wage distribution. Through the discussion we concentrate on the education and mismatch 
variables and disregard the effects of other covariates on earnings6.  
 
5.1 The Subjective model  
 
In Table 4 we report the average (OLS) and quantile returns to schooling obtained with the 
ECHP data under different specifications. All the estimates are controlling for labour market 
experience, training provided by the employer, job tenure, unemployment experience, marital 
status, immigrant condition, health status, establishment size, industry and occupation.  
 
5.1.1 OLS estimates 
In Panel 1 we report the results of a simplified version of Eq. (4) which does not include the 
mismatch variables (‘Standard model with education levels’). We find that the average wage 
premium of tertiary and secondary education is, respectively, 51.9% and 16.7%7. These 
                                                          
6
 The estimates for the full set of controls are available upon request. 
7
 Through the paper we refer to the coefficients reported in the tables as ‘wage effects’ or ‘wage differentials’. To be 
precise, however, the percentage wage difference is given by eβ-1, rather than by β itself, especially when the 
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coefficients change by little (to 49.4% and 15.1%, respectively) when we add, in Panel 2, the 
vector Mi to control for educational mismatches (‘Subjective model’). This new specification 
shows that skills mismatched and strongly mismatched workers earn on average 7.3% and 4.1% 
less, respectively, than their well matched counterparts, while the overqualified are not exposed 
to a significant pay penalty. Two things are worth noting. First, there is evidence to suggest that 
strongly mismatched workers should be considered as a distinct group: they have excess 
qualifications, but earn 4.1% less than the overqualified, and they lack necessary skills, but earn 
3.2% more than the skills mismatched. In other words, this group of workers manages to 
partially compensate the lack of necessary skills with excess education. Second, the null impact 
of overqualification on wages seems to be at odds with earlier research reporting negative and 
significant effects. However, we must note that our group of overqualified workers is restricted 
to include only those who have the necessary skills for their jobs. Those others with insufficient 
skills (the strongly mismatched) do earn lower wages. Moreover, similar studies focus on 
university graduates, among which the effects of mismatch are particularly large. This becomes 
transparent in our next specification. 
 
In Panel 3, we include a full set of interactions between the education groups and the different 
types of mismatch (‘Subjective model with interactions’). As is apparent, the pay penalty of 
mismatch is closely related to the educational attainment of the individual.  Specifically, we find 
that workers with a university degree are exposed to large wage decreases if they enter in jobs 
for which they are skills mismatched (-26.8%) or strongly mismatched (-16.6%). These effects 
are almost four times larger than among individuals with the lowest education level (-7.3% and 
-4.2%, respectively) and turn to non-significant in the upper secondary group. Finally, we note 
that overqualification per se does not bring a significant wage decrease among any of the 
education groups.   
 
5.1.2 Quantile estimates 
Question 1: The inequality increasing effect of education. In line with previous works, we find 
that the ‘Standard model with education levels’ yields returns to education that are highly 
increasing over the wage distribution (Panel 1). The return to tertiary education goes from 
38.3% in the first quantile up to 61.2% in the top quantile, while the return to secondary 
education rises from 10.4% to 21.8%. The differential effect between the .10 and the .90 
                                                                                                                                                                          
estimates are large. We do not perform this transformation to facilitate the correspondence between the tables and the 
text.  
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quantile is reported in the second last column of Table 4. This statistic summarizes the excess 
conditional wage inequality within the education group relative to the reference group (less than 
upper secondary education). Thus, for example, the 23 percentage points (pp) differential in the 
tertiary level indicates that the wage gap between two workers who are seemingly equal but 
located at the two extreme quantiles will be 23% higher if these workers have tertiary and not 
less than upper secondary education. In the last column, we list the p-values of F-tests for the 
joint equality of coefficients at all quantiles. According to the results, differences across 
quantiles are statistically significant. This is, in sum, the essence of the ‘inequality increasing 
effect’ of education documented in Buchinsky (1994), Pereira and Martins (2002), Fersterer and 
Winter-Ebmer (2003), Martins and Pereira (2004) and Machado and Mata (2005). 
 
Questions 2 and 2a: Educational mismatches and the inequality increasing effect of education. 
In Panel 2 we include explicit controls for mismatch. We find that conditional wage dispersion 
within the educated is slightly lower in the resulting model. Specifically, when we switch from 
the standard model to the ‘Subjective model’, the .90-.10 spread of tertiary education decreases 
by 26.1%, from 23.0 to 17.0 pp, while the corresponding spread for secondary education 
decreases by 32.5%, from 11.4 to 7.7 pp. Even though these reductions are sizable, most of the 
dispersion remains, and the corresponding tests reject the equality of coefficients across 
quantiles at conventional significance levels. It is worth noting that the estimating equation 
controls for three different types of educational mismatch simultaneously (overqualification, 
skills mismatch and strong mismatch). Therefore, the results indicate that the inequality 
increasing effect of education cannot be attributed to the incidence of various types of 
mismatch.  
 
This is also the case in Panel 3, where we allow the mismatch effect to differ across education 
groups. Indeed, the results are now more conclusive. Far from a reduction, the ‘Subjective 
model with interactions’ exhibits larger conditional wage dispersion than the standard model. 
Specifically, the within-group conditional dispersion rises by 9.5% in the tertiary level and by 
51.1% in the upper secondary level when we switch from Panel 1 to Panel 3. This can be seen 
by comparing the .90-.10 spreads of the tertiary and secondary group in the ‘Subjective model 
with interactions’ (25.3 and 25.7 pp, respectively) with the corresponding spreads in the 
‘Standard model’ (23.0 and 11.4 pp, respectively). Therefore, there is evidence to suggest that 
the tendency of education to be less rewarded in low pay jobs cannot be explained by the 
prevalence of (various types of) mismatch. This is particularly evident in this more elaborated 
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model, according to which returns to secondary and tertiary education among well-matched 
workers are highly increasing over the earnings distribution. 
 
For illustrative purposes, in Figures 2 and 3 we plot the quantile-return profile of education 
under the different specifications. As is apparent, the returns in the extended models are as 
increasing over the wage distribution as in the standard model. To provide a sensitivity analysis, 
in Table B1 of Appendix B we have re-estimated the coefficients using a restricted rather than a 
full set of controls in the earnings equations8. The first lesson is that returns to education are 
roughly doubled when we switch from the full to the restricted specification, a result that is 
consistent with the sensitivity analyses reported in the literature (Card, 2001). The same applies 
to the mismatch coefficients: about 50% of these effects can be attributed to observables that are 
correlated with mismatch. Thus, for example, the average pay penalty of skills mismatch and 
strong mismatch in the ‘Subjective model’ rises from 7.3% and 4.1%, respectively, to 14.3% 
and 9.9% when we switch from the full to the restricted specification. The second lesson is that 
in the restricted models the conditional wage dispersion among the educated largely persists 
after controlling for mismatch, as in the full models. Thus, for example, in Table B1 the .90-.10 
spread in the tertiary group is 41.5 pp in the ‘Standard model’, 37.0 pp in the ‘Subjective model’ 
and 45.1 pp in the ‘Subjective model with interactions’. In all cases, the spread is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
 
Question 3: Is the pay penalty of educational mismatch homogenous across individuals in 
different segments of the earnings distribution? Next, we turn to the quantile estimates of 
overqualification, skills mismatch and strong mismatch. The results are interesting on their own, 
as they document substantial differences across earnings quantiles. One finding stands out 
prominently from Table 4: the effects of educational mismatches are increasing as we move up 
                                                          
8
 Following a human capital interpretation of the mismatch phenomenon, some authors have suggested that workers 
may accept mismatched work in exchange of training, to compensate for low tenure and experience, or to access 
higher level occupations (Sicherman, 1991, Groot, 1996, Sloane et al., 1999). The full set of controls used in our 
earnings equations is aimed to remove the impact of these and other variables from the mismatch effect. It may be 
argued, however, that most of these covariates are endogenous and that a more parsimonious specification would 
capture the ‘true’ penalty of mismatch more appropriately. Thus, for example, we may not include controls for 
training. As the acceptance of mismatched work may allow some individuals to participate in training activities that 
later on are rewarded in the labour market, we could interpret these wage gains as a return to mismatch rather than a 
return to training. A similar argument applies to other variables, such as occupation and tenure. Following this 
reasoning, the estimates reported in Appendix B are obtained dropping from vector Xi all the controls except 
experience. 
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the wage distribution. The results are illustrative. In Panel 2, the coefficient of overqualification 
switches from non-significant to a (mildly) significant -5.5% when moving from the .10 to the 
.90 quantile. The coefficient of skills mismatch more than doubles, ranging from -5.1% in the 
first quantile up to -14.7% in the top quantile, and the pay penalty of strong mismatch more than 
triples, going from a non-significant -2.7% to a significant -9.1%. A glance to the second last 
column of Table 4 shows that the .90-.10 spreads for overqualification, skills mismatch and 
strong mismatch amount to, respectively, -9.3, -9.7 and -6.3 pp.  
 
These spreads are statistically significant, and rise further when we switch to Panel 3. In the 
‘Subjective model with interactions’ the corresponding pay penalties are remarkably large in the 
upper segments of the distribution, particularly among the educated. At the top quantile, the 
overqualification effect is as large as -18.9% for workers with a tertiary education and -6.6% for 
those with an upper secondary education. The .90-.10 spreads of the overqualification variable 
amount to -16.4 and -23.3 pp in these two groups. Similarly, the wage effects of skills mismatch 
at the top quantile are as large as -66.0% in the tertiary level and -18.5% in the upper secondary 
level, and the corresponding spreads rocket to -71.8 and -29.6 pp, respectively. Finally, we find 
that the .90-.10 spread of the strong mismatch effect is not significant among university 
graduates, but it amounts to -21.1 pp among workers with upper secondary education9.  
 
In a related study, McGuinness and Bennet (2007) obtain a pay penalty of overqualification that 
is highly decreasing, not increasing, along the earnings distribution. Such divergence with our 
results may be due to the fact that theirs are based on a sample of recent graduates, among 
which the overqualified status is more likely to have a transient nature. It is likely that among 
this group, the overeducated are either high-ability individuals who accept mismatched work to 
access high-level occupations (and high wages) or low-ability individuals who, immediately 
after graduation, enter in low-level jobs while they search for suitable jobs. This would be 
consistent with having decreasing effects of overqualification over the wage distribution. 
Another difference is that McGuinness and Bennet base their results on the 
overqualification/non-overqualification distinction, and do not control for other types of 
                                                          
9
 The more differentiated view provided in Panel 3 comes at the cost of reduced cell size in some groups. Thus, for 
example, the number of overqualified workers drops from 1,047 in the total sample to 231 when we consider only the 
group of workers with university education, and a more reduced group results when we consider skills mismatches 
and strong mismatch among university graduates. Even though the interaction coefficients reported in Panel 3 exhibit 
moderate standard errors and are not erratic across quantiles, the reduced cell size of specific groups in a quantile 
regression framework recommend us to interpret the results with some caution.  
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mismatch that can be equally relevant for wages, such as skills mismatches. As a result, their 
estimates across quantiles may be obscuring subtle differences across heterogeneous workers. 
 
Educational mismatches and unobserved ability. All in all, the results uncover across-quantiles 
variation at large scale. Somewhat surprising, this variation has been typically overlooked in the 
literature, even though it can provide useful hints to better understand the mismatch 
phenomenon. In the quantile regression framework, the estimates at different quantiles represent 
the effects of a given covariate for individuals that have the same observable characteristics but, 
due to unobservable earnings capacity, are located in different segments of the conditional 
distribution. Therefore, those workers who end up in high-paid jobs are those who have more 
productive abilities, where by abilities we refer to those marketable skills, academic credentials 
and motivations that allow a worker to earn a higher wage given a vector of observable 
characteristics. Having the labour market segmented by ability deciles, with individual ability 
indexed by the individual’s position in the conditional wage distribution, the estimates at 
different quantiles provide snap-shots of how mismatched individuals within the different 
ability groups are impacted. Turning to the results, we find that educational mismatches are 
events that reduce wages amongst all ability groups. As is apparent in Table 4, in almost every 
quantile and every education group is the pay penalty of skills mismatch found to significantly 
decrease wages. And the same holds, though to a lesser extent, for the strong mismatch effect. 
Taken together, these observations can be hardly reconciled with the frequent interpretation that 
mismatched workers earn less because they are less able. At the top of that, we find that workers 
in the high-ability segments of the distribution are precisely those who are exposed to larger 
wage decreases if they end up in mismatched work. This observation gives further support to 
the view that educational mismatches represent a complex phenomenon in which workers with 
very different backgrounds and abilities are involved. Recently, De Grip et al. (2008) have 
shown that matched and mismatched workers show similar levels of ability, including verbal 
memory, cognitive flexibility, verbal fluency and information processing speed. Our results are 
consistent with this view, as they suggest that describing the mismatch phenomenon as a result 
of lower ability levels is an oversimplification.  
 
5.2 The Statistical model  
 
In Table 5 we present the results of the second model. These are calculated controlling for 
labour market experience, training participation, job tenure, marital status, type of contract, 
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immigrant condition, establishment size and occupation.  
 
5.2.1 OLS estimates 
In Panel 1 we report the estimates of a standard earnings equation with actual years of schooling 
in the right hand side (‘Standard model with years of schooling’), and in Panel 2 we report the 
results of the ORU model. First we focus on the OLS estimates. We find that the returns to 
surplus schooling (3.9%) are lower than the returns to required schooling (6.6%), and that a year 
of deficit schooling carries a significant wage penalty (-4.8%). Consistent with this, the returns 
to required schooling are above the returns to actual years of schooling (4.3%). These 
regularities are in line with the survey of the evidence reported in Hartog (2000) and 
McGuinness (2006) 10.  
 
5.2.2 Quantile estimates 
Next, we examine the dispersion across quantiles obtained with the two specifications. Our 
answers to Question 2 and Question 2a are consistent with those given by the ECHP dataset: 
returns to schooling are highly increasing over the wage distribution and educational 
mismatches cannot account for this fact.  
 
In Panel 1 the return to an additional year of schooling ranges from 2.9% in the bottom quantile 
to 4.9% in the top quantile, and the spread is statistically significant. Adding explicit controls 
for over- and under- qualification in Panel 2 does not reduce the within-education-groups 
dispersion. Far from a reduction, the .90-.10 spread of required schooling (5.3 pp) is found to be 
2.8 times larger than the .90-.10 spread of actual years of schooling (1.9 pp). The results in 
Appendix B are similar, with the coefficient of required schooling ranging from 5.6% in the 
bottom quantile up to 9.6% in the top quantile. This indicates that the inequality increasing 
effect of education is indeed sharper among the well-matched than among the total working 
population (Figure 4). Or, in other words, conditional wage dispersion among the educated 
would be also substantial if there were not mismatched workers in the labour market.  
 
Question 2b: Degree of mismatch and the inequality increasing effect of education. A 
particularity of the statistical model is that it controls not only for the type of educational 
mismatch (over- versus under-qualification) but also for the amount of mismatch (as measured 
                                                          
10
 Across studies, the return to surplus, required and deficit schooling range from 3% to 5%, from 5% to 11%, and 
from -2% to -6%, respectively.  
 22
by years of over- or under-schooling). The estimates unambiguously show that, although 
potentially relevant, this ingredient does not alter our main conclusion. 
 
Question 3: Is the pay penalty of educational mismatch homogenous across individuals in 
different segments of the earnings distribution? In an earlier work, Hartog et al. (2001) used an 
ORU specification to explore the evolution of returns to schooling in Portugal from 1982 to 
1992. They found that during the sample period the return to a year of schooling above the job 
requirement was typically higher among workers with higher earnings. Our results are 
consistent with this view. Specifically, we detect substantial individual heterogeneity in the 
returns to over- and under- schooling. The returns to overschooling are low among low-ability 
workers and high among high-ability workers. The estimated coefficient more than doubles as 
we move from the very bottom to the top of the distribution, going from 2.3% to 4.8%. The pay 
penalty of underschooling shows a similar pattern, ranging from 3.7% to 4.9%. It is interesting 
to note that as we move from the bottom to the top quantile, the returns to required schooling 
increase by 5.3 pp, i.e., 2.2 times more than the returns to overschooling (2.4 pp). This implies 
that relative to required schooling, the wage loss of overschooling increases over the wage 
distribution, and the same applies to underschooling. These profiles confirm, again, the earlier 
findings from the ECHP: the wage effects of mismatch are higher precisely among those 
workers with higher unobserved earnings capacity.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Returns to education are increasing over the wage distribution. While researchers have focused 
on the inequality implications of this finding, little attention has been paid to its potential 
causes. This is the first paper that formally tests whether educational mismatches can account 
for the tendency of education to be less rewarded in low-paid jobs. Answering this question was 
compelling, as in the political arena educational mismatches are being put forward as one of the 
major sources behind the high earnings dispersion of educated workers in developed countries. 
We have used two alternative datasets (the ECHP and the PLFS), two different measurement 
methods (the ‘subjective’ and the ‘statistical’ approach), different definitions of mismatch 
(‘overqualification’, ‘underqualification’, ‘skills mismatch’ and ‘strong mismatch’) and 
alternative earnings equations.  
 
The paper has produced two main findings. Both of them are robust to changes in the 
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measurement and definition of mismatch and changes in the estimating model. The first result is 
that within-education-groups wage dispersion is at least as large among well-matched workers 
as among the total working population. Therefore, we must reject the hypothesis that the higher 
wage dispersion among the educated is due to the prevalence of (different types and degrees of) 
educational mismatches in the labour market.  
 
The second result is that the wage effects of mismatch are by no means constant over the 
conditional wage distribution. Rather, they are found to be remarkably larger at the upper 
segments of the distribution. This result contributes to a better perception of the causes and 
consequences of the phenomenon. First, it highlights the substantial individual heterogeneity that 
surrounds the mismatch effect. This heterogeneity stems not only from differences between 
education groups (university graduates are exposed to larger wage losses if they end up in 
mismatched work) but within groups as well. Researchers and policy makers should take this 
heterogeneity into account when attempting to ascertain the impact of educational mismatches on 
different population groups and on the total earnings distribution. To that purpose, focusing on 
averages may be seriously misleading. Second, most of the debate in the policy arena has 
gravitated around the question of to what extent the incidence of mismatch entails a productivity 
loss. It is very difficult to know whether the lower earnings observed for mismatched workers are 
caused by their mismatch, or whether individuals with lower earnings capacity end up in 
mismatched work. Several papers have explored this issue using panel data (Bauer, 2002), 
proxies of skills (McGuinness, 2003) and treatment effects models (Dolton and Silles, 2008). In 
this paper we have provided an alternative view using quantile regression. The major advantage 
of this approach is that it documents how workers who are mismatched within homogenous 
ability groups are impacted relative to their well-matched counterparts. We have found evidence 
to suggest that interpreting the mismatch phenomenon as a consequence of the low ability and 
skills possessed by some workers can be overly simplistic. Indeed, workers with higher 
unobserved ability are precisely those who are more heavily penalized in mismatched jobs. We 
claim, therefore, that educational mismatches are to a large extent the result of real inefficiencies 
in which the worker’s productivity potential is constrained by the job class.  
 
A limitation of the paper is that schooling levels are assumed to be exogenous. This 
simplification is based on several considerations. First, the main hypothesis outlined in this 
study is inspired in consistent evidence reported in Buchinsky (1994), Pereira and Martins 
(2002), Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer (2003), Martins and Pereira (2004), Machado and Mata 
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(2005). On the account of the extra complication of quantile regression, these authors abstract 
from selection effects, and so we do. Re-assessing the existing evidence and re-testing our 
hypotheses in a context of endogenous schooling is beyond the scope of the present paper. And 
second, there is evidence to suggest that assuming exogenous schooling is not crucial for the 
results. Several authors have shown that standard returns to education do not change by more 
than one third when ability and selectivity are taken into account (Card, 2001, Trostel et al., 
2002). Moreover, there are results in the literature showing that adding explicit controls for 
ability in a quantile regression framework produces similar levels of within-education-groups 
wage dispersion (Chernozhukov et al., 2007).  
 
Finally, there are several policy implications arising from the analysis. First, education pays off 
in terms of wages, although the dispersion of this payoff increases as individuals invest in more 
education. We have shown that the increased dispersion is independent from the prevalence of 
educational mismatches in the labour market. This finding warns prospective students that even 
if they end up in matched jobs the returns to their educational investment are subject to a 
substantial amount of uncertainty. As investors tend to avoid risks, it is likely that this 
uncertainty exerts a negative effect on the demand for further education among certain 
individuals. In this respect, policies oriented to reduce the variability in the private returns to 
schooling by easing the school-to-work transition and by relating the private costs of education 
to the individual future earnings may be of particular importance.  
 
Second, countries make substantial investments from both public and private sources in 
education. It is important to ensure that the education programmes they support are effective 
and that the benefits are distributed equitably. However, the mismatch phenomenon points to 
existing rigidities in labour markets that limit the capacity of societies to fully utilise and reward 
highly educated workers. In this respect, policies aimed to improve the integration between the 
schooling system and the changing demand for different types of skills in the society seem to be 
in order. 
 
An agenda for further research is, first, gathering new data with detailed information on the 
individuals’ abilities, skills and educational background and, second, improving the 
measurement of mismatch. The phenomenon requires a multidimensional approach that 
simultaneously considers all the knowledge, capabilities and skills that can be needed in a job 
and compares them to those possessed and effectively used by the individual. These extensions 
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would allow us to obtain a more refined view on how workers who are mismatched in several 
ways and to different degrees are penalized in the labour market. Such analysis would help the 
profession in the task of disentangling what individual and institutional factors and to what 
extent are responsible for the existence of mismatched workers. 
 
 
Appendix A. Definition of variables. 
 
Net hourly wage. ECHP and PLFS: monthly net salary in the main job (in euros) divided by 
four times the weekly hours worked in the main job.  
Education. Maximum level of completed schooling. ECHP: three categories based on the 
ISCED-97 classification: less than upper secondary, upper secondary, and tertiary education. 
PLFS: ten categories, each of them paired with the corresponding years of schooling.   
Training. Dummy variable. ECHP: activated if the employer provided training to the worker 
during the previous year. PLFS: activated if the worker has ever participated in a training 
activity. 
Experience. ECHP and PLFS: age minus age of first job. 
Tenure. ECHP and PLFS: difference between the year of the survey and the year of the start of 
the current job. Three categories were constructed: from 1 to 4 years, from 5 to 9 years, and 10 
years or more. 
Permanent contract. PLFS: dummy variable. Takes the value 1 if the individual has a 
permanent contract, zero otherwise. 
Single. ECHP and PLFS: dummy that takes the value 1 if the individual is single (including 
widow and divorced), zero otherwise (married or living in a couple). 
Immigrant. ECHP and PLFS: dummy activated if the individual was born in a foreign country. 
Services. ECHP: dummy that takes the value 1 if the individual works in the services sector, 
zero if he works in the industry sector. 
Firm size. ECHP and PLFS: decomposed into four categories, from 1 to 19 employees, from 20 
to 99 employees, from 100 to 499 employees, and 500 employees or more . 
Bad health. ECHP: individuals report their health status using a scale that ranges from 1 (very 
good) to 5 (very bad). The dummy ‘bad health’ takes value one if the answer is 4 or 5. 
Past unemployment. ECHP: dummy variable, activated in case of unemployment experience 
before current job. 
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Occupation.  ISCO-88 classification disaggregated at the 2-digit level up to 25 occupations 
(ECHP) and National Classification of Occupations disaggregated at the 2-digit level up to 29 
occupations (PLFS). In Tables 1 and 3 this variable has been aggregated into 9 broader 
categories. 
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Appendix B. Estimates with a restricted set of controls 
 
OLS θ =.10 θ =.20 θ =.30 θ =.40 θ =.50 θ =.60 θ =.70 θ =.80 θ =.90 ∆(.90-.10)
Panel 1. Standard model with education levels
                                       Tertiary 0.957 *** 0.697 *** 0.799 *** 0.857 *** 0.921 *** 0.979 *** 1.019 *** 1.077 *** 1.077 *** 1.112 *** 0.415 *** 30.73 ***
0.023 0.029 0.027 0.030 0.021 0.039 0.023 0.029 0.027 0.030
                                       Upper Secondary 0.308 *** 0.155 *** 0.205 *** 0.214 *** 0.247 *** 0.284 *** 0.323 *** 0.365 *** 0.408 *** 0.442 *** 0.288 *** 38.41 ***
0.013 0.021 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.020
                                       R-squared 0.400 0.179 0.180 0.179 0.182 0.192 0.207 0.228 0.264 0.297
Panel 2. Subjective model
                                       Tertiary 0.851 *** 0.628 *** 0.710 *** 0.784 *** 0.821 *** 0.880 *** 0.897 *** 0.953 *** 0.947 *** 0.998 *** 0.370 *** 26.10 ***
0.024 0.031 0.034 0.029 0.031 0.034 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.039
                                       Upper Secondary 0.255 *** 0.134 *** 0.170 *** 0.188 *** 0.206 *** 0.243 *** 0.262 *** 0.303 *** 0.332 *** 0.376 *** 0.242 *** 19.86 ***
0.013 0.021 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.018 0.016 0.019 0.022
                                       Overqualification 0.020 0.038 * 0.041 ** 0.035 ** 0.043 * 0.036 * 0.021 -0.017 -0.011 -0.026 -0.064 * 2.17 *
0.017 0.022 0.019 0.017 0.022 0.020 0.025 0.020 0.022 0.032
                                       Skills mismatch -0.143 *** -0.084 *** -0.085 *** -0.092 *** -0.106 *** -0.122 *** -0.148 *** -0.190 *** -0.190 *** -0.213 *** -0.129 *** 9.12 ***
0.014 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.022 0.018 0.017 0.026
                                       Strong mismatch
-0.099 *** -0.061 *** -0.055 *** -0.058 *** -0.076 *** -0.087 *** -0.111 *** -0.123 *** -0.127 *** -0.132 *** -0.071 *** 3.71 ***
0.014 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.017 0.024 0.020 0.017 0.026
                                       R-squared 0.418 0.187 0.188 0.190 0.193 0.204 0.219 0.243 0.280 0.313
Panel 3. Subjective model with interactions
                                       Tertiary 0.943 *** 0.661 *** 0.781 *** 0.901 *** 0.995 *** 0.996 *** 0.988 *** 0.989 *** 1.041 *** 1.112 *** 0.451 *** 9.37 ***
0.040 0.062 0.075 0.078 0.063 0.032 0.047 0.045 0.067 0.066
                                       Upper Secondary 0.209 *** -0.015 0.075 0.099 *** 0.141 *** 0.190 *** 0.245 *** 0.328 *** 0.394 *** 0.435 *** 0.450 *** 13.97 ***
0.038 0.038 0.047 0.032 0.041 0.039 0.071 0.054 0.056 0.048
                               Overqualification
                                       Tertiary
-0.099 ** -0.044 -0.060 -0.108 -0.156 ** -0.111 ** -0.079 -0.035 -0.101 -0.136 * -0.092 0.90
0.047 0.079 0.084 0.085 0.064 0.049 0.056 0.057 0.067 0.073
                                       Upper Secondary 0.106 *** 0.185 *** 0.154 *** 0.169 *** 0.182 *** 0.151 *** 0.096 0.006 -0.035 -0.066 -0.251 *** 5.17 ***
0.040 0.048 0.052 0.042 0.044 0.041 0.070 0.055 0.055 0.051
                                       Less than Upper Sec. 0.012 -0.004 0.012 0.017 0.021 0.021 0.015 -0.021 -0.025 -0.008 -0.004 1.16
0.020 0.021 0.023 0.016 0.026 0.019 0.028 0.030 0.028 0.041
                                Skills mismatch
                                       Tertiary
-0.284 *** -0.007 -0.196 ** -0.367 *** -0.420 *** -0.450 *** -0.500 *** -0.608 *** -0.628 *** -0.760 *** -0.753 *** 10.59 ***
0.101 0.077 0.093 0.096 0.080 0.075 0.080 0.111 0.159 0.194
                                       Upper Secondary -0.052 0.062 -0.013 -0.017 -0.055 -0.107 ** -0.147 ** -0.262 *** -0.293 *** -0.256 *** -0.318 *** 5.97 ***
0.040 0.043 0.047 0.034 0.043 0.044 0.065 0.054 0.064 0.070
                                       Less than Upper Sec.
-0.093 *** -0.111 *** -0.107 *** -0.100 *** -0.104 *** -0.114 *** -0.125 *** -0.177 *** -0.181 *** -0.198 *** -0.087 *** 4.39 ***
0.016 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.022 0.023 0.019 0.029
                                 Strong mismatch
                                       Tertiary -0.401 *** -0.439 ** -0.291 * -0.405 *** -0.284 * -0.263 *** -0.274 *** -0.376 *** -0.318 -0.265 *** 0.174 0.51
0.068 0.214 0.150 0.157 0.146 0.099 0.095 0.134 0.205 0.317
                                       Upper Secondary
-0.108 *** 0.087 * 0.042 0.026 -0.025 -0.048 -0.081 -0.146 ** -0.201 *** -0.230 *** -0.317 *** 6.88 ***
0.042 0.050 0.046 0.030 0.046 0.045 0.069 0.057 0.058 0.057
                                       Less than Upper Sec. -0.137 *** -0.087 *** -0.085 *** -0.066 *** -0.074 *** -0.078 *** -0.087 *** -0.115 *** -0.116 *** -0.109 *** -0.022 1.55
0.015 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.016 0.016 0.025 0.026 0.021 0.033
                                       R-squared 0.420 0.190 0.016 0.192 0.196 0.207 0.221 0.244 0.281 0.313
No. of observations 8,319
F-test
Table B1. Returns to schooling and mismatch effects - ECHP, resctricted set of controls
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Notes to Table B1: i) dependent variable: log hourly wages; ii) standard errors are in smaller type; iii) OLS estimation is heteroskedastic-robust; iv) 
quantile standard errors have been calculated using a bootstrap method of 500 replications; v) * denotes significant at the 10% confidence level, ** 
denotes significant at the 5% confidence level, *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; vi) the last column reports, for each covariate i, the F-
statistic of the test , β...ββ :H i0.9,i0.2,i0.1,0 ===  ββ :H i h,i j,1 ≠ for some hj ≠ ; vii) Controls: labour market experience and year dummies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∆(.90-.10)
                                   Actual years of schooling 0.069 *** 0.043 *** 0.050 *** 0.054 **
*
0.059 *** 0.063 *** 0.069 *** 0.073 *** 0.079 **
*
0.084 *** 0.041 **
*
75.12 **
*0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002
                                   R-squared 0.158 0.056 0.085 0.102 0.111 0.129 0.146 0.168 0.185 0.198
0.042 *** 0.027 *** 0.031 *** 0.035 **
*
0.036 *** 0.038 *** 0.041 *** 0.043 *** 0.047 **
*
0.051 *** 0.024 **
*
8.78 **
*0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004
0.080 *** 0.056 *** 0.063 *** 0.068 **
*
0.073 *** 0.078 *** 0.082 *** 0.086 *** 0.091 **
*
0.096 *** 0.041 **
*
63.33 **
*0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
-0.057 *** -0.044 *** -0.050 *** -0.053 **
*
-0.055 *** -0.056 *** -0.057 *** -0.056 *** -0.057 **
*
-0.061 *** -0.017 **
*
4.03 **
*0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004
                                   R-squared 0.179 0.069 0.100 0.120 0.133 0.154 0.172 0.194 0.211 0.221
No. of observations 11,947
OLS θ =.10 θ =.20 θ =.90θ =.60θ =.30 θ =.40 θ =.50
                                   Years of underschooling
F-test
Panel 2. ORU model
                                   Years of overschooling
Panel 1. Standard model with years of schooling
θ =.70 θ =.80
Table B2. Returns to schooling and mismatch effects - PLFS, restricted set of controls
                                   Years of required schooling
 
Notes to Table B2: i) dependent variable: log hourly wages; ii) standard errors are in smaller type; iii) OLS estimation is heteroskedastic-robust; iv) 
quantile standard errors have been calculated using a bootstrap method of 500 replications; v) * denotes significant at the 10% confidence level, ** 
denotes significant at the 5% confidence level, *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; vi) the last column reports, for each covariate i, the F-
statistic of the test , β...ββ :H i0.9,i0.2,i0.1,0 ===  ββ :H i h,i j,1 ≠ for some hj ≠ ; vii) Controls: labour market experience and dummies for quarter. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics by mismatch status - ECHP
Variables Adequately 
educated Overqualified
Skills 
Mismatched
Strongly 
mismatched
Proportion of the total sample 10.4 12.6 44.6 32.4
Log hourly wage 1.19 1.25 0.89 0.91
Log hours 3.73 3.74 3.74 3.74
Tertiary education 0.15 0.22 0.01 0.01
Upper secondary education 0.21 0.33 0.05 0.13
Less than upper secondary education 0.64 0.45 0.94 0.86
Training 0.21 0.32 0.03 0.05
Experience 15.4 12.2 17.4 15.7
Tenure < 5 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.54
5 ≤ Tenure < 10 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28
Tenure ≥10 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.18
Single 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.42
Immigrant 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.03
Services 0.51 0.58 0.32 0.43
Firm size < 20 0.51 0.45 0.65 0.62
20 ≤ Firm size < 100 0.27 0.27 0.24 0.24
100 ≤ Firm size < 500 0.13 0.17 0.08 0.10
Firm size ≥ 500 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.04
Bad health 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.03
Past unemployment 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.24
Legislators, senior officials and managers 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01
Professionals 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.01
Technicians and associate professionals 0.13 0.18 0.02 0.04
Clerks 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.10
Service workers and shop and market sales workers 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.15
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Craft and related trades workers 0.34 0.22 0.45 0.37
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.17
Elementary occupations 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.15
 
 
 
Table 2. The incidence of mismatch by education levels (%)
Total Sample Less than    
upper secondary Upper secondary Tertiary
   Overqualified 12.6 6.9 32.3 58.5
   Skills mismatched 44.6 51.1 18.3 2.8
   Strongly mismatched 32.4 33.9 32.4 6.6
   Adequately educated 10.4 8.1 17.0 32.2
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics by mismatch status - PLFS
Variables Adequately 
educated Overqualified Underqualified
   Proportion of the total sample 44.6 36.8 18.7
   Actual years of schooling 5.49 7.70 4.98
        Years of overschooling 0.00 3.35 0.00
        Years of underschooling 0.00 0.00 4.35
   Log hourly wage 1.06 1.01 1.12
   Log hours 3.71 3.72 3.70
   Training 0.05 0.09 0.09
   Experience 24.3 14.7 22.8
   Tenure < 5 0.38 0.50 0.36
   5 ≤ Tenure < 10 0.19 0.23 0.20
   Tenure ≥ 10 0.42 0.27 0.44
   Permanent contract 0.47 0.47 0.47
   Single 0.20 0.43 0.28
   Immigrant 0.01 0.02 0.01
   Firm size < 20 0.26 0.28 0.29
   20 ≤ Firm size < 100 0.06 0.06 0.07
   100 ≤ Firm size < 500 0.03 0.02 0.03
   Firm size ≥ 500 0.65 0.64 0.61
Executive civil servants, industrial directors and executives 0.01 0.00 0.03
Professionals and scientist 0.03 0.00 0.05
Middle management and technicians 0.05 0.02 0.20
Administrative and related workers 0.06 0.01 0.32
Service and sales workers 0.07 0.15 0.09
Farmers and skilled agricultural and fisheries workers 0.03 0.02 0.03
Skilled workers, craftmen and similar 0.43 0.48 0.14
Machine operators and assembly workers 0.19 0.21 0.04
Unskilled workers 0.11 0.11 0.09
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Table 4.  Returns to schooling and mismatch effects - ECHP
OLS θ
 =.10 θ =.20 θ =.30 θ =.40 θ =.50 θ =.60 θ =.70 θ =.80 θ =.90 ∆(.90-.10) F-test
Panel 1. Standard model with education levels
                                       Tertiary 0.519 *** 0.383 *** 0.461 *** 0.493 *** 0.504 *** 0.496 *** 0.498 *** 0.534 *** 0.550 *** 0.612 *** 0.230 *** 2.74 **
0.029 0.044 0.047 0.034 0.036 0.033 0.034 0.043 0.066 0.071
                                       Upper Secondary 0.167 *** 0.104 *** 0.141 *** 0.147 *** 0.154 *** 0.164 *** 0.166 *** 0.180 *** 0.189 *** 0.218 *** 0.114 *** 4.47 ***
0.012 0.020 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.017 0.026 0.025
                                       R-squared 0.504 0.243 0.246 0.249 0.257 0.271 0.286 0.305 0.333 0.367
Panel 2. Subjective model
                                       Tertiary 0.494 *** 0.351 *** 0.442 *** 0.474 *** 0.463 *** 0.476 *** 0.481 *** 0.501 *** 0.524 *** 0.521 *** 0.170 ** 3.76 ***
0.029 0.040 0.052 0.034 0.040 0.033 0.034 0.038 0.074 0.063
                                       Upper Secondary 0.151 *** 0.087 *** 0.122 *** 0.145 *** 0.141 *** 0.149 *** 0.155 *** 0.171 *** 0.161 *** 0.164 *** 0.077 ** 4.11 **
0.012 0.020 0.016 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.017 0.024 0.029
                                       Overqualification -0.001 0.038 0.010 0.019 0.012 0.012 -0.016 -0.026 -0.066 ** -0.055 * -0.093 *** 2.13 *
0.016 0.020 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.019 0.023 0.022 0.026 0.029
                                       Skills mismatch
-0.073 *** -0.051 *** -0.047 *** -0.046 *** -0.046 *** -0.047 *** -0.078 *** -0.083 *** -0.140 *** -0.147 *** -0.097 *** 5.48 ***
0.013 0.018 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.020 0.018 0.021 0.020
                                       Strong mismatch
-0.041 *** -0.027 -0.014 -0.019 -0.016 -0.020 -0.050 *** -0.052 *** -0.093 *** -0.091 *** -0.063 ** 3.00 **
0.014 0.018 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.023
                                       R-squared 0.507 0.247 0.248 0.252 0.259 0.273 0.288 0.307 0.338 0.373
Panel 3. Subjective model with interactions
                                       Tertiary 0.552 *** 0.395 *** 0.511 *** 0.549 *** 0.564 *** 0.569 *** 0.567 *** 0.541 *** 0.579 *** 0.648 *** 0.253 ** 2.44 **
0.045 0.076 0.068 0.059 0.057 0.053 0.046 0.057 0.107 0.080
                                       Upper Secondary 0.113 *** -0.051 * 0.008 0.047 0.081 * 0.154 *** 0.173 *** 0.241 *** 0.216 *** 0.206 *** 0.257 *** 10.79 ***
0.035 0.029 0.037 0.031 0.043 0.037 0.051 0.050 0.039 0.042
                               Overqualification
                                       Tertiary -0.068 -0.025 -0.070 -0.071 -0.074 -0.058 -0.075 -0.002 -0.092 -0.189 ** -0.164 ** 1.96 *
0.042 0.071 0.072 0.059 0.053 0.052 0.048 0.052 0.086 0.084
                                       Upper Secondary 0.045 0.166 *** 0.109 *** 0.112 *** 0.077 0.035 -0.014 -0.073 -0.098 ** -0.066 ** -0.233 *** 4.66 ***
0.036 0.043 0.042 0.037 0.047 0.039 0.053 0.054 0.047 0.030
                                       Less than Upper Sec. -0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.016 0.013 0.026 -0.013 -0.023 -0.047 -0.017 -0.018 1.59
0.019 0.018 0.020 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.026 0.032 0.040
                                Skills mismatch
                                       Tertiary -0.268 *** 0.058 -0.113 -0.203 *** -0.258 *** -0.246 *** -0.292 *** -0.315 *** -0.486 *** -0.660 *** -0.718 *** 7.42 ***
0.055 0.106 0.089 0.079 0.087 0.087 0.073 0.074 0.091 0.087
                                       Upper Secondary -0.030 0.111 *** 0.089 ** 0.055 0.029 -0.039 -0.103 ** -0.165 *** -0.207 *** -0.185 *** -0.296 *** 7.76 ***
0.038 0.039 0.044 0.037 0.087 0.038 0.051 0.055 0.046 0.050
                                       Less than Upper Sec. -0.073 *** -0.079 *** -0.063 *** -0.051 *** -0.043 *** -0.032 ** -0.070 *** -0.072 *** -0.117 *** -0.119 *** -0.040 * 4.06 ***
0.014 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.016 0.018 0.017 0.024 0.024
                                 Strong mismatch
                                       Tertiary -0.166 * -0.176 -0.298 ** -0.332 ** -0.319 *** -0.192 -0.241 ** -0.201 -0.320 0.091 0.268 0.93
0.098 0.104 0.122 0.140 0.111 0.123 0.112 0.139 0.253 0.309
                                       Upper Secondary 0.005 0.107 ** 0.126 *** 0.088 *** 0.048 -0.011 -0.063 -0.111 ** -0.120 *** -0.104 ** -0.211 *** 5.94 ***
0.036 0.045 0.038 0.033 0.043 0.037 0.048 0.051 0.040 0.044
                                       Less than Upper Sec. -0.042 *** -0.056 *** -0.032 ** -0.025 * -0.012 -0.007 -0.044 ** -0.039 ** -0.072 *** -0.064 ** -0.008 3.33 ***
0.015 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.025 0.025
                                       R-squared 0.508 0.250 0.251 0.254 0.261 0.274 0.289 0.308 0.339 0.374
No. of observations 8,319
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Notes to Table 4: i) dependent variable: log hourly wages; ii) standard errors are in smaller type; iii) OLS estimation is heteroskedastic-robust; iv) quantile standard 
errors have been calculated using a bootstrap method of 500 replications; v) * denotes significant at the 10% confidence level, ** denotes significant at the 5% 
confidence level, *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; vi) the last column reports, for each covariate i, the F-statistic of the test 
, β...ββ :H i0.9,i0.2,i0.1,0 ===  ββ :H i h,i j,1 ≠ for some hj ≠ ; vii) Controls: labour market experience, training provided by the employer, job tenure, unemployment 
experience, marital status, immigrant condition, health status, establishment size, industry, occupation and year dummies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Returns to schooling and mismatch effects - PLFS
∆(.90-.10)
                                   Actual years of schooling 0.043 *** 0.029 *** 0.034 *** 0.036 *** 0.038 *** 0.040 **
*
0.043 **
*
0.045 *** 0.048 **
*
0.049 **
*
0.019 **
*
10.86 ***
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
                                   R-squared 0.210 0.120 0.145 0.159 0.167 0.182 0.197 0.217 0.232 0.239
0.039 *** 0.023 *** 0.029 *** 0.031 *** 0.035 *** 0.037 **
*
0.039 **
*
0.042 *** 0.044 **
*
0.048 **
*
0.024 **
*
8.65 ***
0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004
0.066 *** 0.040 *** 0.051 *** 0.049 *** 0.055 *** 0.059 **
*
0.061 **
*
0.067 *** 0.072 **
*
0.093 **
*
0.053 **
*
2.97 **
0.009 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.016
-0.048 *** -0.037 *** -0.040 *** -0.043 *** -0.042 *** -0.044 **
*
-0.046 **
*
-0.047 *** -0.051 **
*
-0.049 **
*
-0.012 ** 1.57
0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005
                                   R-squared 0.210 0.121 0.146 0.160 0.167 0.183 0.198 0.217 0.232 0.239
No. of observations 11,947
F-testθ =.20 θ =.90θ =.80θ =.70θ =.60
                                   Years of overschooling
Panel 2. ORU model
θ =.50θ =.40
Panel 1. Standard model with years of schooling
θ =.30OLS θ =.10
                                   Years of underschooling
                                   Years of required schooling
 
Notes to Table 5: i) dependent variable: log hourly wages; ii) standard errors are in smaller type; iii) OLS estimation is heteroskedastic-robust; iv) quantile standard 
errors have been calculated using a bootstrap method of 500 replications; v) * denotes significant at the 10% confidence level, ** denotes significant at the 5% 
confidence level, *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; vi) the last column reports, for each covariate i, the F-statistic of the test 
, β...ββ :H i0.9,i0.2,i0.1,0 ===  ββ :H i h,i j,1 ≠ for some hj ≠ ; vii) Controls: labour market experience, training participation, job tenure, marital status, type of contract, 
immigrant condition, establishment size, occupation and dummies for quarter. 
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Figure 1. Modal years of schooling – Frequency. Based on the calculation of the modal 
years of schooling by occupations. The vertical bars represent the number of occupations in 
each education level. Source: Portuguese Labour Force Survey 2000-2002 
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Figure 2. Quantile returns to tertiary education. This graph shows how the return to 
tertiary education changes when moving from the lower to the upper segments of the 
earnings distribution. X-axis: OLS and selected earnings quantiles. Y-axis: return to 
education. Source: European Community Household Panel 1994-2001. 
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Figure 3. Quantile returns to upper secondary education. This graph shows how the 
return to upper secondary education changes when moving from the lower to the upper 
segments of the earnings distribution. X-axis: OLS and selected earnings quantiles. Y-
axis: return to education. Source: European Community Household Panel 1994-2001. 
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Figure 4. Quantile returns to actual and required years of schooling. This graph shows 
how the returns to schooling change when moving from the lower to the upper segments 
of the earnings distribution. X-axis: OLS and selected earnings quantiles. Y-axis: return 
to education. Source: Portuguese Labour Force Survey 2000-2002 
 
 
 
